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970 F.2d 1138
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
HARRIS TRUST AND SAVINGS
BANK, as Trustee for the Sperry Master
Retirement Trust # 2, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE CO., Defendant–Appellee.
JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, Third–Party Plaintiff,
v.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,
N.A., Counterclaim–Defendant,
and
Sperry Corporation and The Retirement Committee
of Sperry Corporation, Third–Party Defendants.
No. 979, Docket 91–7854.  | Argued
Feb. 11, 1992.  | Decided July 30, 1992.
Trustee of retirement trust brought action against insurer
alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), breach of contract, and other common
law claims. Summary judgments dismissing claims were
granted by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Robert P. Patterson, Jr., J.,722
F.Supp. 998 and 767 F.Supp. 1269, and trustee appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) group annuity contract itself, constituting a guaranteed
benefits policy, was not a plan asset as to which insurer
had fiduciary responsibility, but (2) insurer was fiduciary
as to funds that were not converted to fixed, guaranteed
obligations but instead were subject to fluctuation based on
insurer's investment performance; (3) insurer did not breach
contract by terminating nonguaranteed benefit payments on
31 days notice even though pension administration fund was
sufficient to allow for such payments; and (4) vacated order
had no collateral estoppel effect.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
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Although group annuity contract was guaranteed
benefit policy and issuer of annuities did not
act as fiduciary under ERISA in administering
it to extent that contract provided for benefits
guaranteed by the issuer, issuer was a fiduciary
with respect to funds which were not converted
to fixed, guaranteed obligations but instead
were subject to fluctuation based on the issuer's
investment performance, and fact that all assets
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account was not significant in view of issuer's
discretionary authority over the nonguaranteed
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Opinion
*1140  MINER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Harris Trust and Savings Bank as Trustee
for the Sperry Master Retirement Trust No. 2 and its
successor, the Unisys Master Trust (“Harris Trust”), appeals
from a final judgment entered on August 16, 1991 in
the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Patterson, J.) in favor of defendant-
appellee John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
(“Hancock”). The final judgment dismissed in its entirety the
amended complaint in this action in accordance with two
opinion-orders, the first granting partial summary judgment
dismissing Harris Trust's claim for breach of fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1947
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and the second granting
summary judgment dismissing Harris Trust's contract and
common law claims. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank,
as Trustee of the Sperry Master Retirement Trust No. 2
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 722 F.Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y.1989) (“Harris I ”) and Harris Trust & Savings
Bank, as Trustee of the Sperry Master Retirement Trust No.
2 v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 767 F.Supp. 1269
(S.D.N.Y.1991) (“Harris II ”).
The dispute between the parties centers upon a certain
contract known as Group Annuity Contract No. 50 (“GAC
50”), originally entered into in 1941 between Hancock and
Sperry Rand Corporation to fund a retirement plan for the
benefit of Sperry employees. Sperry has undergone a number
of changes in name and corporate form since the execution of
GAC 50 but will be referred to herein by its original name.
Harris Trust is the present trustee of the retirement plan and
the ultimate successor to Sperry's right as contractholder of
GAC 50. In Harris I, the district court decided that Hancock
was exempt from the fiduciary responsibility provisions of
ERISA in connection with the management of GAC 50 for
the reason that GAC 50 is a “guaranteed benefit policy.” In
Harris II, the district court decided that there was no basis for
any of the contractual and other common law claims pleaded
by Harris Trust against Hancock. The sole challenge to Harris
II raised by Harris Trust on this appeal relates to the district
court's rejection of the claim that Hancock breached GAC
50 by terminating the payment of non-guaranteed pension
benefits. As to the ERISA fiduciary claims disposed of in
Harris I, Harris Trust argues here, as it did in the district court,
that Hancock is an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the assets
it holds under GAC 50; that Hancock is an ERISA fiduciary
in respect of the contract itself; and that Hancock is in any
event collaterally estopped from re-litigating the fiduciary
status issue as the consequence of an order in another case,
subsequently vacated, deciding the very question presented
here.
To assist us in resolving the issue of fiduciary responsibility,
we solicited an amicus brief from the United States
Department of Labor, the government agency charged with
the enforcement of ERISA. The Department apparently has
issued an Interpretive Bulletin, as well as two Advisory
Opinions, bearing on the issue. The Bulletin is not entirely
clear and appears to be in conflict with the Opinions.
Following oral argument, the Clerk of the Court, at our
direction, invited the submission of an amicus brief within
thirty days of receipt of her letter dated February 12, 1992.
By motion dated March 3, 1992, the Department of Labor
sought an extension to May 12, 1992, asserting that the
additional time (approximately three months) was needed
because (1) the Secretary had not formulated a final position
on the issue; (2) the case was important and complex; (3)
more time was needed for an examination of legislative and
regulatory history; (4) a review of the record was required;
and (5) approval of the Department of Justice was required.
Recognized in the moving papers was the split in circuit court
authority on the issue and the Secretary's interest in promoting
uniformity. We granted the requested extension.
By letter dated May 11, 1992 from Marshall J. Breger,
Solicitor of Labor, we were advised as follows:
During the time allotted by the Court,
we have undertaken an extensive
review of *1141  the legal and
policy issues involved in this matter.
Regrettably, we have concluded that
the need to fully consider all of the
implications of these issues within the
Department precludes our providing
the Court with a brief within a
foreseeable time frame. Accordingly,
rather than seek a further extension, I
feel constrained to decline the Court's
invitation.
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We do not understand why the Solicitor of Labor is unable
to provide an amicus brief “within a foreseeable time frame”
and can only deplore his failure to do so in this case. While
it is not unusual for a government agency to decline an
invitation to file an amicus brief on account of bureaucratic
inertia or inability to articulate a coherent policy, see Popkin
v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719 n. 15 (2d Cir.1972); Securities
Industry Ass'n v. Connolly, 703 F.Supp. 146, 155 n. 16
(D.Mass.1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir.1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 956, 110 S.Ct. 2559, 109 L.Ed.2d 742
(1990), it is unconscionable for an agency to request a
substantial extension of time and then fail to file the promised
brief. It is especially egregious to request an extension as
long as that requested here and then to advise in effect that
no extension would be long enough. Courts do not have the
luxury of deferring decisions indefinitely, however, and we
proceed to dispose of the matter before us. We reverse in
part on the fiduciary duty issue and affirm on the contract
termination issue.
BACKGROUND
As originally constituted on March 1, 1941, GAC 50 provided
for the purchase of individual deferred annuities from
Hancock for the Sperry Defined Benefit Retirement Plan.
These annuities were purchased on an annual basis for each
employee with premiums, or contributions, paid to Hancock
by Sperry. They provided for regular payments to eligible
Sperry employees or their beneficiaries following retirement.
The premiums became part of Hancock's general account of
corporate funds, and Hancock issued the guaranteed annuities
at purchase rates fixed by the contract.
By amendment effective January 1, 1968, GAC 50 was
converted from a deferred annuity form of contract to a
Retrospective Immediate Participation Guarantee (“Retro–
IPG”) form of contract. The deferred annuities purchased
prior to January 1, 1968 were technically cancelled and the
assets supporting them placed in a Pension Administration
Fund (“PAF”). However, the cancellation of the pre–1968
annuities did not affect the guarantees of benefits by Hancock
to the participants and beneficiaries. With respect to the
Retro–IPG, net investment income was directly credited to
the PAF on an annual basis. The amount credited depended
upon Hancock's general account investment performance and
the allocation of that performance to the PAF. Under the 1968
amendment, Hancock guaranteed that once an employee's
retirement annuity has been established, Hancock is obligated
to make all future payments due under the annuity. Hancock
also guaranteed that the PAF on any date would not be less
than it otherwise would have been if the sum of the net interest
earned and capital gains and losses apportioned to the PAF
had always been zero from January 1, 1968. (Hancock in
effect guaranteed that the PAF would never fall below its
January 1, 1968 level.) As in the case of the deferred annuity
form of contract, the premiums paid under the Retro–IPG
contract became part of Hancock's general corporate funds.
The 1968 amendment required that the PAF be maintained at
a level sufficient to meet the Liabilities of the Fund (“LOF”)
as computed by Hancock. LOF is the contractual reserve
for the possible future purchase of annuities for the benefit
obligations guaranteed by Hancock. The specific requirement
was that the PAF balance be maintained at a level at least
105 per cent of LOF. The amount in the PAF in excess of
this minimum operating level (“MOL”) has been referred to
by the parties as “free funds.” If Sperry failed to maintain
Fund balances at or above MOL, termination of the PAF
would be triggered. Upon termination, the contract would
cease to function in the manner of a Retro–IPG, the cancelled
pre–1968 annuities would be *1142  “repurchased” and the
contract would function thereafter in the manner of a deferred
annuity contract. For more than 20 years, the PAF balance
in GAC 50 has exceeded its MOL. The 1968 amendment
also established a method for the provision of additional
benefits for the period after December 31, 1967: upon the
retirement of an eligible employee, Hancock would determine
the amount by which the LOF would increase if the portion of
the retirement benefit in the period after January 1, 1968 were
to be “guaranteed” by Hancock. If GAC 50' s PAF balance
exceeded the contractual MOL based upon the increased
LOF, Hancock would guarantee the payment of the additional
benefits.
On August 1, 1977, GAC 50 again was amended. This
amendment involved its conversion to a Retrospective
Immediate Participation Guarantee/Prospective Deferred
Liability (“Retro–IPG–PDL”) form of contract. Under the
amendment, the LOF would not automatically be increased
upon the retirement of any employee, and new retirement
benefits would not be guaranteed by Hancock. The Sperry
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retirement committee could request that Hancock establish
guaranteed benefits in addition to those already guaranteed,
but did not do so. Sperry was entitled to designate employees
eligible for non-guaranteed benefits and did designate
employees to receive such benefits from the free funds in the
PAF. Hancock paid such benefits on a monthly basis through
June of 1982, when it gave notice as provided in the contract
that it would no longer pay non-guaranteed benefits under the
Retro–IPG–PDL.
Contending that Hancock's elimination of the non-guaranteed
benefit payments and its elimination of the “rollover”
procedure (under which withdrawals of excess funds from the
PAF were allowed on two occasions) left it with no means
of withdrawing any of the increasing free funds without
terminating the contract and causing the purchase of annuities
at inflated prices, Harris Trust commenced this action on July
20, 1983. It was the Trustee's position that Hancock employed
an artificially low interest assumption to calculate the LOF,
resulting in: the setting of LOF at a level much higher
than necessary to provide the benefits guaranteed under the
contract, oversecuring Hancock and preventing termination;
and a geometrically increasing level of free funds in the PAF.
Because it allegedly was denied access to the accumulating
free funds over a substantial period of time, and because
Hancock was said to have administered GAC 50 improperly,
Harris Trust sought in the amended complaint in this action to
recover the non-guaranteed benefits withheld by Hancock, the
losses resulting from Hancock's breach of duties, the profits
made by Hancock using Sperry funds, and damages in an
amount to be determined at trial. The complaint also sought
the removal of Hancock as fiduciary, judgment enjoining
Hancock from further violations of its duties, and other relief.
Hancock pleaded counterclaims against Harris Trust and
interposed a third-party complaint against Sperry, demanding
judgment over in the event that it was found liable to Harris
Trust for the breach of any common law or fiduciary duty.
As previously described, the district court granted summary
judgment in Harris I dismissing the ERISA fiduciary claims
and in Harris II dismissing the contractual and other common
law claims. The counterclaims and third-party complaint
thereafter were dismissed as moot.
DISCUSSION
I. ERISA Fiduciary Status
(a) As to Assets in General Account
Harris Trust claims that Hancock bears fiduciary
responsibilities to the Plan and its participants as to the free
funds in the PAF under the provisions of ERISA. As defined
in ERISA, one is
a fiduciary with respect to
a plan to the extent ... he
exercises any discretionary authority
or discretionary control respecting
management ... or disposition of its
assets ...
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). An insurance company holding
a certain type of pension fund asset in its general account
escapes the definition and the concomitant duties of *1143
a fiduciary in accordance with the following provision:
In the case of a plan to which a
guaranteed benefit policy is issued by
an insurer, the assets of such plan
shall be deemed to include such policy,
but shall not, solely by reason of the
issuance of such policy, be deemed to
include any assets of such insurer.
29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2). A guaranteed benefit policy is
an insurance policy or contract to the
extent that such policy or contract
provides for benefits the amount of
which is guaranteed by the insurer.
29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2)(B).
[1]  It seems clear that, at least to the extent it provides for
benefits guaranteed by Hancock, GAC 50 is a guaranteed
benefit policy and Hancock does not act as a fiduciary in
administering it. The question is: Do the free funds, as to
which no guarantees are available, affect the status of GAC
50 as a guaranteed benefit policy excepted from the definition
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of plan assets? The district court answered that question in
the negative:
Each time ERISA uses the word ‘benefit,’ it refers to the
payments made to the employees themselves. See, e.g., 29
U.S.C. § 1002(7) (‘ “participant” means any employee ...
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any
type from an employee benefit plan’); id. § 1002(8) (‘
“beneficiary” means a person designated by a participant ...
who is or may become entitled to a benefit’); id. §§
1023(e), 1054, 1056, 1104(a)(1)(A)(i), 1108(c)(1). The
word ‘benefit’ in the guaranteed benefit policy exception ...
refer[s] to benefits and payments to covered employees.
Because GAC 50 provides for fixed payments to covered
employees, it is covered by the guaranteed benefit policy
exception.
Harris I, 722 F.Supp. at 1017–18.
We think that the district court erred in concluding that GAC
50 in its entirety is covered by the guaranteed benefit policy
exception. In the plain language of the statute, a contract is a
guaranteed benefit policy only “to the extent that” it provides
for benefits that an insurer guarantees. Although Hancock
provides guarantees with respect to one portion of the benefits
derived from the contract, it does not do so at all times with
respect to all the benefits derived from the other, or free funds,
portion. The non-guaranteed portion is dependent upon the
insurer's investment experience and therefore is variable with
respect to the benefits it provides. Legislative history supports
the view that the free funds held in the GAC 50 PAF are
plan assets and not included within the guaranteed policy
exception:
If the policy guarantees basic
payments but other payments
may vary with, e.g., investment
performance, then the variable part
of the policy and assets attributable
thereto are not to be considered as
guaranteed, and are to be considered
as plan assets subject to the fiduciary
rules.
H.R.Rep. No. 93–1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5077 (“Conference
Report”).
When confronted with a situation similar to the one before us,
the Seventh Circuit recognized that group annuity contracts
such as GAC 50 can be analyzed in terms of their guaranteed
and non-guaranteed elements. The Seventh Circuit held in
Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.1983) that the
contract in that case was not a guaranteed benefit policy in
its variable accumulation phase because the amount of funds
available to the pension plan was determined by the manner
in which the insurer exercised its investment discretion:
The pension trustees did not buy
an insurance contract with a fixed
payout; they turned over the assets
of the pension plan to [the insurance
company] to manage with full
investment discretion, subject only to
a modest income guaranty. If the
pension plan had hired an investment
advisor and given him authority to buy
and sell securities at his discretion for
the plan's account, the advisor would
be a fiduciary within the meaning of
the act, and that is essentially what
*1144  the trustees did during the
accumulation phase of the contract....
Id. at 327.
Similarly, in the case before us the insurer has maintained
funds that were not converted to fixed, guaranteed obligations
but instead were subject to fluctuation based on the insurer's
investment performance. But the statute defining “guaranteed
benefit policy,” as noted previously, refers only to that phase
of the contract in which the insurer is obligated to guarantee
fixed benefits to plan participants. To the extent that the
insurer engages in the discretionary management of assets
attributable to that phase of the contract which provides no
guarantee of benefit payments or fixed rates of return, it
seems to us that the insurer should be subject to fiduciary
responsibility. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
The district court of course disagreed with the reasoning of
Peoria Union, holding that retirement plan assets such as
GAC 50 do not include funds held in an insurer's general
account. In support of its conclusion, the district court
reasoned that the
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amount provided to the covered
employees remains fixed even if
the PAF falls below the minimum
operating level and the contract
reverts to a deferred annuity
type.... [I]f Hancock's general account
experiences negative investment
results, it must still pay the covered
employees the amounts to which they
are entitled.... Hancock could request
additional contributions from Harris
Trust, but Harris Trust would be
free to decline. GAC 50 would then
revert to deferred annuity form, and
Hancock would be obliged to provide
annuities to all covered employees
in consideration of the benefits
guaranteed to those employees up to
that time.
Harris I, 722 F.Supp. at 1016–17.
The flaw in this reasoning lies in the fact that at certain times,
until there is a conversion to guaranteed benefits, Hancock
is managing assets taken in under GAC 50 as to which there
are no guarantees. The fact that all the assets of GAC 50 are
held in Hancock's general account is not significant in view
of Hancock's discretionary authority over the non-guaranteed
phase of the contract. In Mack Boring and Parts v. Meeker
Sharkey Moffitt, 930 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.1991), the Third Circuit
adopted the district court's approach in a case involving a
contract with attributes similar to those of GAC 50. The
Third Circuit held that the contract was, in its entirety, a
guaranteed benefit policy because it was a “general account
insurance contract in which the issuing insurance company
guarantees to the plan participants a fixed amount of benefits,
payable at a clearly stated time.” Id. at 277. It was sufficient
for the Mack Boring court that the contract made provision
for “guaranteed benefits to plan participants at some finite
point in the future.” Id. at 273. That court in effect extended
the statutory exemption to the entirety of any contract under
which any benefits are guaranteed, so that the exemption
would apply regardless of the apportionment between the
guaranteed component and the investment component of the
contract.
Two Advisory Opinions issued by the Department of Labor
lend support to the notion that the free funds in GAC 50 are
plan assets as to which Hancock is an ERISA fiduciary. In the
first, reference is made to
a Congressional intent that when
an insurance company provides
investment advice which determines
the rate of return to the plan and its
participants, the assets in the account
shall constitute plan assets so that the
insurance company is subject to the
fiduciary responsibility provisions of
the Act.
DOL Advisory Opinion 78–8A (March 13, 1978). As to
at least one component of GAC 50, Hancock's investment
performance clearly does affect the amount of funds available
to the plan and its participants.
According to the second DOL Advisory Opinion,
a conventional separate account
(which holds contributions received
from a plan and provides for the
crediting of income on such amounts
based upon the investment experience
of the separate account) *1145  would
not be considered to be maintained
in connection with a fixed contractual
obligation of the insurance company
merely because assets of the separate
account are ultimately applied to
provide fixed annuities to participants,
and the assets of such a separate
account would be considered to be
plan assets.
DOL Advisory Opinion 83–51A (September 21, 1983). The
Department of Labor in the second opinion thus appears to
take the position that “plan assets” for the purpose of the
fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA do not lose their
status as such merely because the ultimate use of the account
may be to provide fixed annuities, where the plan assets are
affected by investment performance.
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Both advisory opinions were preceded by a seemingly
contradictory Department of Labor pronouncement,
Interpretive Bulletin 75–2:
If an insurance company issues a
contract or policy of insurance to
a plan and places the consideration
for such contract or policy in its
general asset account, the assets in
such account shall not be considered to
be plan assets. Therefore, a subsequent
transaction involving the general asset
account between a party in interest and
the insurance company will not, solely
because the plan has been issued such
a contract or policy of insurance, be a
prohibited transaction.
This Interpretive Bulletin was confirmed in a regulation
adopted November 13, 1986. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75–
2 entitled “Interpretive bulletin relating to prohibited
transactions.” Despite the confusion, it seems to us that the
Interpretive Bulletin was designed to deal with prohibited
transactions in regard to conflict of interest situations. Indeed,
the preamble to the regulation recites that IB 75–2 was issued
with respect to whether a party in
interest has engaged in a prohibited
transaction with ... a corporation or
partnership ... in which the plan has
invested.
There is no inconsistency in considering certain assets to be
plan assets for general fiduciary duty purposes but not for
prohibited transaction purposes. See Associates in Adolescent
Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 729 F.Supp. 1162,
1184–85 (N.D.Ill.1989), aff'd, 941 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1099, 112 S.Ct. 1182, 117 L.Ed.2d 426
(1992).
(b) As to the GAC 50 Contract
[2]  We agree with the district court that the contract itself,
GAC 50, is not a plan asset as to which Hancock has a
fiduciary responsibility. According to the statute, the assets of
a plan to which an insurer issues a guaranteed benefit policy
“shall be deemed to include such policy.” 29 U.S.C. § 1101(b)
(2). The policy itself, with its bundle of contractual rights
and responsibilities, therefore is similar to any other financial
instrument owned by an employee benefit plan. Hancock
is not a fiduciary in regard to the policy here, however,
because it does not “exercise[ ] any discretionary authority or
discretionary control ... respecting management or disposition
of” the policy itself. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). Only Harris
Trust as contractholder has discretionary authority over the
guaranteed benefit policy qua policy.
The view that the holder of the contract is the entity subject
to fiduciary responsibility is supported by legislative history:
A trust is not to be required in the
case of plan assets which consist
of insurance (including annuity)
contracts or policies issued by an
insurance company qualified to do
business in a State (or the District
of Columbia) .... Although these
contracts need not be held in trust,
nevertheless, the person who holds the
contract is to be a fiduciary and is to
act in accordance with the fiduciary
rules ... with respect to these contracts.
Conference Report, supra, at 5079.
Obviously, Hancock has no power unilaterally to alter or
amend a contract to which it is a party. It can act only
under the terms of the policy, and any change in the policy
requires the consent of the contractholder. We here deal with
the policy in its entirety, and any power that Hancock had
was referable to the terms of that policy. While Hancock
may act as a fiduciary in *1146  carrying out certain of its
contractual duties under the policy as previously described,
it has no fiduciary responsibility in regard to the undivided
contract. Neither of the cases that Harris Trust relies upon to
support the argument that Hancock will be held to fiduciary
standards with respect to the contract itself is apposite. In
both Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc., 805
F.2d 732, 737–38 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915,
107 S.Ct. 3188, 96 L.Ed.2d 676 (1987), and Chicago Bd.
Options Exchange, Inc. v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
713 F.2d 254 (7th Cir.1983), the insurer had and exercised a
unilateral right to alter in its discretion a critical contract term,
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resulting in prejudice to the contractholder. Such was not the
case here, where Hancock at all times exercised its express
rights under the contract. Fiduciary duties were implicated
only when Hancock became involved in the administration
or management of plan assets not referable to guaranteed
benefits. See Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d
1402, 1416–17 (2d Cir.1985); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1159–60 (3d Cir.1990).
(c) As Affected By Prior Litigation
[3]  In Jacobson v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
655 F.Supp. 1290, withdrawn pursuant to settlement, 662
F.Supp. 1103 (D.Conn.1987), the plaintiff pension plan
trustees asserted that Hancock was a fiduciary with respect
to a Retro–IPG contract, similar to GAC 50, and the funds
held under the contract. The Jacobson court granted partial
summary judgment, holding that funds received by Hancock,
not converted to fixed guaranteed obligations but held subject
to fluctuations based on investment performance, were “plan
assets” for which the insurer was accountable as an ERISA
fiduciary. Hancock thereafter settled with the trustees, and
the opinion was withdrawn pursuant to the settlement. Harris
Trust argues that Hancock is estopped from relitigating the
issue of its status as an ERISA fiduciary by the vacated district
court order.
The district court properly rejected the argument of Harris
Trust that Hancock is collaterally estopped from relitigating
its fiduciary status as to Retro–IPG contracts by virtue of the
district court's decision in Jacobson. The order entered on the
stipulation of the parties in that case included the following
language:
ORDERED, that the Order, together with the findings and
conclusions embodied therein, is withdrawn, set aside and
vacated, and shall be of no force or effect for use against
defendant, its successors and assigns, by plaintiffs, by the
Pension Fund or by third parties, for collateral estoppel or
other preclusive purposes....
Jacobson, 662 F.Supp. at 1113. It is well-settled in this circuit
that a vacated order has no collateral estoppel effect. See
Corporation of Lloyd's v. Lloyd's U.S., 831 F.2d 33, 36 (2d
Cir.1987); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 578
F.Supp. 911, 919–20 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 112
(2d Cir.1984). We have held that it is an abuse of discretion
for a district court to refuse to enter a vacatur pursuant to a
settlement providing that the vacated order would not have
collateral estoppel effect in any subsequent action. Nestle Co.
v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir.1985). We
recognized in Nestle “the importance of honoring settlements
over the finality of trial court judgments.” Id. at 283.
The district court correctly refused to estop Hancock from
litigating its fiduciary status on the basis of Jacobson.
II. Contract Termination
[4]  Harris Trust contends that Hancock breached GAC
50 by terminating non-guaranteed benefit payments. We
reject that contention and agree with the district court
that Hancock properly terminated these benefits on 31
days notice. Hancock properly relied upon the following
contractual provision as conferring the right to terminate:
Section 9. Payment of Non-guaranteed Benefits.
Non-guaranteed Benefit payments shall be payable to
a payee, provided the Pension Administration Fund is
sufficient for the purpose, upon written notice *1147  from
the [employer] to the [insurer].... Non-guaranteed Benefit
payments shall continue until
* * * * * *
(c) the date as of which the [insurer], by written notice filed
with the Retirement Committee at least thirty-one days
prior thereto, declares its intention to cease such payments.
GAC 50, 1977 Amendment, Article 4, Section 9.
It is the position of Harris Trust that Hancock has the right to
terminate non-guaranteed benefit payments only if the PAF
is insufficient to allow for such payments. That position is
predicated principally on two provisions in the contract:
On and after the Benefit
Commencement Date of an employee,
the Non-guaranteed Benefit for such
an employee or his designated
survivor shall be payable hereunder
in accordance with the Plan until the
earliest of the date of his death, the date
the Retirement Committee notifies the
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Company in accordance with Section 9
of Article IV that said Non-guaranteed
Benefit payments are to be cancelled,
suspended or adjusted, or the date
the Pension Administration Fund is
not sufficient to provide the Non-
guaranteed Benefits for the payee.
GAC 50, 1977 Amendment, Article II, Section 3.
On the Benefit Commencement Date
of an employee and on each date
thereafter on which a Non-guaranteed
Benefit is due with respect to
an employee on or before the
date of termination of the Fund,
a Non-guaranteed Benefit shall be
provided hereunder with respect to
each employee entitled thereto. The
Company shall be liable for any
amount of Non-guaranteed Benefit
expressed to be payable only to the
extent to which the Fund is sufficient
to provide such amount.
GAC 50, 1977 Amendment, Article III, Section 2(b).
Contrary to the reading of Harris Trust, the contract does
not prohibit termination before the PAF becomes insufficient.
The Article III provision is entitled “Contributions” and in the
main deals with the methods of contributions to the plan. The
quoted language makes the unexceptional statement that non-
guaranteed benefits are available only to the extent permitted
by the PAF. The Article II provision is entitled “Dates of
Coverage and Plan of Benefits” and deals specifically with
those matters covered by that title. To say as that provision
does that non-guaranteed benefits shall be payable until the
date of death, notification by the Retirement Committee
or the date the PAF is insufficient is not to gainsay the
later provision of Article IV for termination on the basis
of another contingency, i.e., thirty-one days notice. It is
significant that Article IV follows the provisions upon which
Harris Trust relies and, as amended, is entitled “Provisions
Pertaining to the Payment of Benefits.” It also is significant
that Section 9 of Article IV is entitled “Payment of Non–
Guaranteed Benefits,” repeats the grounds for termination
previously recited and adds one besides—termination on
notice. Important, if not controlling for our purposes, is the
fact that all the grounds for termination provided in Section 9
are accorded equal dignity by being listed separately.
[5]  [6]  Although the district court took some testimony
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(e) to determine whether there
was an issue of fact in connection with the motion for
summary judgment, it ultimately determined that
the alleged conflict in language
between Article IV, Section 9, and
Article II, Section 3, relied on
by plaintiff is resolved by the
underlying structure of the contract
itself, as to which there is no
genuine issue of material fact....
Accordingly, Hancock's termination
of non-guaranteed benefits in 1982 did
not constitute a breach of contract.
Harris II, 767 F.Supp. at 1278. We endorse the conclusion
of the district court. Where the language of a contract is
clear, summary judgment is appropriate, and the fact that
one party may have a different interpretation of the language
does not make it any less plain. See Investors Ins. Co. v.
Dorinco Reins. Co., 917 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir.1990). The
proper interpretation *1148  of a contract is a question of
law for the court. See Hunt Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1277 (2d Cir.1989). Extrinsic evidence
is unnecessary where it is determined that the contractual
language is unambiguous. See Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 66
N.Y.2d 570, 573, 498 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346, 489 N.E.2d 231,
233 (1986). The district court properly limited itself to the
unambiguous contractual language in resolving the issue of
termination in this case.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is reversed to the extent
that it determined that Hancock had no fiduciary duty with
regard to the excess funds allocated to the payment of non-
guaranteed benefits and affirmed in all other respects. The
case is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
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